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Abstract The introduction of innovative fishery policies in New Zealand has
recently attracted international attention. The introduction of an ITQ system
was premised on the notion of Crown ownership of fishery resources. Conflict
has accompanied these policies as Maori people have challenged the govern-
ment over ownership of fishery resources and declaimed the skewed impact of
the fishery policies. This paper examines the source of these problems focus-
sing particularly on the Treaty of Waitangi negotiated in 1840 between the
Crown and heads of Maori tribes. The Treaty guaranteed to Maori the full,
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their fisheries and other properties,
guarantees which were until recently ignored. The Crown has subsequently
ceded some authority over and ownership of fishery resources to Maori.
Keywords New Zealand fisheries policies, Treaty of Waitangi, resource own-
ership, distributional impact, Maori unemployment rate.
Introduction
In New Zealand, as in other New World societies, disputes over ownership and
access to land and other resources have been a source of long standing grievances.
These grievances have centred on the failure of successive governments to honour
the Treaty of Waitangi negotiated in 1840 between the Crown and the heads of
Maori tribes. Under the Treaty, the Crown guaranteed to Maori the full, exclusive
and undisturbed possession of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries and other
properties.' Recent articles have briefly noted the impact of New Zealand fishery
policies on Maori but have not adequately described the confiicts which have
arisen over fishery policies during the past seven years (Clark, Major and MoUet
1988, and Dewees 1989). Controversey has focussed on two issues: ownership of
the fishery resources; and the skewed impact of fishery policies. The current
article attempts to explain the genesis of those problems and explores the role of
fishery policies in the confiicts.
The authors wish to thank Associate Professor P. Maitra, University of Otago and Dr G.
Cant, University of Canterbury, and the two anonymous referees for their comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
' The English and Maori language versions of the Treaty do not exactly correspond and this
has added to the problems in determining ownership of the resources.
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Maori people constitute approximately nine percent of the total New Zealand
population and in terms of their current socio-economic status, occupy a lowly
position within the New Zealand society.^-^ This may be attributed in significant
measure to dispossession of the Maori consequent on European settlement and
lack of Maori participation in the export-based pastoral economy. The develop-
ment of the modern New Zealand society has, to a very large extent, been dom-
inated by European values. Maori values, economic systems and forms of gov-
ernment, including traditional institutions for resource management, have to a
large extent, become marginalised. The guarantees and privileges accorded to
them by the Crown, including rights of access to land and water resources, and
participation in management decisions, were overlooked or deliberately ignored in
the growing apparatus of state sponsored legislation and related instruments for
resource allocation and management.
Only very recently have the concerns of the Maori people been accorded some
degree of political recognition. From the Maori perspective attempts by the gov-
ernment to restructure the New Zealand economy and the public sector have
raised important issues relating to ownership and management of fishery and
other natural resources. The government, the fishing industry, and the Maori
people, the principal actors involved, sought to grapple with these conflicts. The
Labour Government pledged to honour the Treaty settlement of Maori property
rights over New Zealand's fisheries within the framework of suitable institutional
arrangements for sustainable management of this resource.
Restructuring of the Fishing Industry Consequent on Colonization
Economic restructuring is not a new phenomenon in New Zealand. The present
economic system, which is the subject of restructuring policies has, from a more
historical perspective, itself been a product of a more drastic restructuring pro-
cess. This eventually led to the disintegration of the traditional, predominantly
indigenous, Maori economy and the growth of an export oriented economy within
the global mercantile framework.
In many societies impacted by European colonization, particularly in Africa
and Asia, agricultural and mineral export enclaves which developed were juxta-
posed with traditional subsistence economies of the indigenous people. Over time
a significant degree of dependence emerged between the two sectors, but often to
th6 benefit of the former. By comparison, Maori traditional economic systems
were not able to survive to any significant degree in New Zealand. While it may
have been assumed that the Maori would eventually become assimilated into the
modern mainstream economy, it can be argued that in some respects, their posi-
tion was marginalised to a far greater degree compared to the experience of many
^ Table I provides data on Maori and Non-Maori populations. The defmition of Maori used
in this and following tables is extracted from New Zealand Census forms . . . 'persons who
specified themselves as half or more New Zealand Maori plus those who indicated they
were persons of the Maori race of New Zealand, but did not specify the degree of origin.'
During the 1960s and 1970s the Maori-descent population recorded growth rates more than
double those of the total population. (Royal Commission on Social Policy 1988 p. 386 vol
II)
^ New Zealand Planning Council (1988). For example unemployment rates amongst the
Maori are significantly greater than for the total population as Table 3 below shows.New Zealand Maori 155
other societies colonised by the Europeans during the nineteenth century. Expla-
nations for this marginalisation include the imposition of a system of individual
property rights on Maori society, and the rapid outnumbering of the Maori pop-
ulation by numbers of colonists. While Maori population in 1840 exceeded Euro-
pean population by perhaps 70 to 1, numbers were equal within twenty years, and
Maori population fell to 4.5 percent of total population in 1921.
The pre-colonial Maori tribes shared, to varying degrees, a combined land and
water based culture. The descendants of the Polynesian migrants to Aotearoa
(New Zealand) learnt, over the course of a thousand years, to develop successful
niches within a dynamic physical and cultural environment (Cumberland 1962).
Consequently, on the eve of European settlement in New Zealand, the early
explorers and missionaries and their successors witnessed in a number of regions,
several relatively large, flourishing coastal communities whose economic base
was dependent on fishing. Fish were an important commodity of local and inter-
tribal trade as well as a staple diet. Recent research findings collated by the
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Source: Department of Statistics Monthly Abstract of Statistics, 1989, and Various Cen-
suses.
* Defmition of full time member of labour force changed from 20 to 30 hours per week
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Waitangi Tribunal, based on ethnographic, archeological and historical accounts
and substantiated by oral evidence attest to the existence of a substantial indig-
enous fishing industry during the pre-colonial period (Waitangi Tribunal 1988).
The process of European colonisation initiated fundamental and lasting
changes in the traditional Maori society. The New Zealand Land Wars which
began in 1860, dislocated the indigenous economy by confiscation of land for
European settlement. Initially, the large quantities of Maori grown produce
played a significant part in feeding the European population of the Auckland
Province, and provided an important contribution to the exports of the newly
established settlement. However, since the 1860s, Maori agriculture experienced
a rapid decline (Hargreaves 1959,1960). The fate of the Maori fishing industry was
to prove comparable.
The model of a dual economy provides a suitable conceptual framework to
discuss the changes in the New Zealand fishing industry. In the early whaling
industry in New Zealand, during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth
centuries, Maori and the Europeans were commonly jointly involved on the basis
of a mutually acceptable partnership. In contrast, the subsequent development of
the fishing industry in New Zealand came to be characterised by structural dif-
ferentiation in the form of a duality. This polarisation, which manifests itself in
terms of differences in participation, gradually came to acquire distinctive eco-
notnic and technological characteristics during the twentieth century.
The state has played a significant role as an actor in facilitating these changes.
The primary and most enduring objective of the successive early settler govern-
ments, in a climate of periodic economic uncertainty, was to establish a foothold
for the European economy in New Zealand, and subsequently to promote its
growth (Franklin 1978). An inevitable outcome of this process was restructuring
of the fishing industry, which effectively displaced the Maori. However, it would
be overstating the argument to assert that such state policies were actively for-
mulated and implemented by the government, and on the basis of a clearly artic-
ulated long term strategy. In hindsight, these actions appear to have evolved
incrementally over the course of several decades and without much consideration
of their possible implications.
Until the 1930s, involvement by the State was limited to promoting exploita-
tion of fishery resources, strongly dominated by a laissez faire attitude. A system
of restricted fishery licensing was introduced in 1937 in response to overfishing
concerns. But it was subsequently rescinded in 1963 because it was believed that
the resource was being under exploited. Licenses generally became available on
deriiand but by 1976 it became clear that parts of the inshore fishery had been
overfished and certain species were under threat and requiring regulation.
The relative lack of interest on the part of the state has to be seen in the wider
context of the political economy. Even though there may have been a general
perception within settler communities of the nineteenth century of the relative
abundance of fishery resources in New Zealand waters, in terms of its wealth
generating potential this resource did not appear to hold the same attraction as
land. Hence investment and the attention of early governments were focussed on
acquisition and development of land. The success in 1882 of exports of refriger-
ated mutton and dairy products to the distant British markets, effectively sealed
the future of New Zealand as a grasslands based export economy for the next
hundred years. In fact, it was not until the end of the 1970s that fish became aNew Zealand Maori 157
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Source: Department of Statistics Various Census.
significant export commodity and earner of foreign exchange.'* The New Zealand
fishing industry was until then, a small scale industry, with large numbers of small
boats, mostly owner operated. Its operations were restricted largely to the inshore
fisheries and as Table 2 illustrates, provided limited employment compared to
other sectors of the economy. Maori participation tended to be communal, part
time, non-monetised, and quite likely underestimated in census enumerations.
A number of factors precipitated rapid expansion of the commercial fishing
industry after the mid-1970s. The New Zealand economy found itself in a deep-
seated crisis, following the entry of Britain into the European Community and the
OPEC-generated oil price shock. The response of the government, faced with
declining popularity, was to introduce a number of strategies in an attempt to
increase exports. To this end, primary producers including fishers, were offered
generous production incentives. The enactment of the Exclusive Economic Zone
Act in 1977, coupled with industry pressure, spurred the government to encourage
New Zealand companies into the deeper water fisheries through a package of
assistance measures (Cullen and Memon 1990). These incentives included a duty
free import scheme, concessionary interest and suspensory loans through the
Rural Bank to finance the purchase of large vessels, and more general assistance
measures such as investment allowances, export tax incentives and price support
schemes for the primary production sectors of the domestic economy.
Equally significantly, the government also sought to encourage low risk ex-
pansion of the domestic industry by allowing companies to enter into joint venture
arrangements with foreign firms. Given the relatively underdeveloped state of the
domestic fishing industry, joint venture arrangements were seen as a means to
enable domestic firms to acquire fishing technology and expertise in areas and in
vessels which were unfamiliar to domestic fishermen, as well as knowledge of
international markets and access to those markets (Cullen and Memon 1990).
" Fish exports comprised 0.5 percent of total New Zealand exports in 1960, 1.4 percent of
total exports in 1970, and 6 percent in June Year 1987. See Cullen and Memon (1990)158 AU Memon and Cullen
Maori fishers could in principle participate in this expansion and development of
the fishing industry but in practice rarely did so. The reasons for this non-
involvement appear to include both preference and constraint factors including
the following: Maori people have a strong attachment to the land, and a preference
for almost subsistence level living; Rural Maori tended to be part-time land work-
ers in order to retain their land, and part-time fishers in order to supplement their
income; Maori people had relatively lower educational and business expertise
levels and a comparative lack of ambition to develop modern business enterprises
(Waitangi Tribunal 1988).
To summarize, given the relatively small size and unsophisticated technology
of the commercial fishing industry in New Zealand, there was an inevitable over-
lap between the Pakeha (European) and Maori fishing sectors. Nonetheless, in the
long term, the cumulative impact of change on the Maori fishing industry has
proved to be little different from the parallel impact on Maori agriculture. From an
historical perspective, the development of the modern commercial fishing indus-
try had comparable dislocating impacts on Maori participation as the growth of
European agriculture had on Maori farmers. Equally significant has been the role
of the state. While the state has not, until recently, exercised an aggressive role in
its capacity as a development agent, its intervention was nevertheless instrumen-
tal in fostering the expansion of the commercial fishing industry. This was to the
detriment of small scale operators and particularly Maori fishing interests.
Restructuring of the Fishing Industry in the 1980s
While the government initiatives and industry response were instrumental in rapid
expansion of the New Zealand fishing industry and growth of exports during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, they precipitated an escalating crisis. Biological and
economic sustainability came to be seen as critical issues facing the industry,
making inevitable the introduction of industry restructuring measures. The cause
of this structural problem was attributed to overcapitalisation resulting from com-
petitive fishing of a common property resource (Cullen and Memon 1990). Over-
capitalisation in the catching sector was most critical in the East Coast and North-
land regions of the North Island, which had significant concentrations of Maori
population, many of whom were part-time fisherman. While total fish landings by
the domestic fieet had steadily increased since 1978, there had been a decline in
most inshore species landings. The shortfall in inshore catches was offset by
substantial catches of the deepwater species (orange roughy and groper) by the
larger New Zealand trawlers. While there was still a relatively large number of
part-time fishermen, the New Zealand industry had now come to be dominated by
a handful of large operators. Thus by 1981, 5 percent of the vessels caught more
than 67 percent of the total fish and 3000 boats out of a total of 3928 landed less
than 10 percent of the catch.^ In order to promote stability and efficiency in the
industry, the government proposed in 1983 to adopt an alternative management
regime of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ).^
ITQ grant rights to catch specified quantities of fish but ensure that Total
' MAF (1983) p. 4.
* Several studies have examined the introduction of the New Zealand ITQ system including
Clark, Major and MoUet (1988), Dewees (1989), and Cullen and Memon (1990).New Zealand Maori 159
Allowable Catches are set at sustainable levels. Such a management system,
based on creating tradable individual property rights, was advocated as a highly
effective way of achieving the twin objectives of biological sustainability and
economic efficiency. Introduced in October 1986, ITQs aim to control fishing by
establishing quasi-property rights to fish. After research and/or estimation has
established the sustainable yields of each species in each zone. Total Allowable
Catches (TAC) are set and then allocated in small parcels to fishing companies.
These parcels are permanent rights to catch fish of a designated species in a
specified zone.
Claimed major advantages of the ITQ system are its ability to impose control
on total quantity of fish caught while allowing fishing companies to catch fish at
least cost. TAC can be varied under the ITQ system and this fiexibility is needed
to deal with overfishing of particular species. However, the introduction and
acceptance of the ITQ as a management tool for New Zealand fisheries has proved
to be a protracted affair. A key presumption in the introduction and use of the ITQ
system in New Zealand was initial Crown ownership of the fishery resources. The
presumption has proved to be highly controversial, as discussed below.
The Muriwhenua Claim
In seeking to operationalise the ITQ management system, the Crown ran into
resistance from a pressure group it presumably least expected to delay the im-
plementation of what was perceived as an innovative and radical policy instru-
ment. While the officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as
the Minister, had been sensitive enough to consult and solicit the support of the
organisations representing the fishing industry during the process of negotiating
the development of the ITQ management system, the government initially chose
to ignore Maori interests. The fishing industry was represented by two organisa-
tions, the Fishing Industry Association represented the handful of large corpora-
tions while the Federation of Commercial Fishermen represented the smaller,
predominantly European operators.
The existence of the Waitangi Tribunal is a major reason why the Maori have
been able to function as an effective pressure group to challenge the introduction
of the ITQ system. In order to placate continual Maori land grievances, the more
conservative and rural based National administration initially set up the Waitangi
Tribunal in 1975. However, its mandate was deliberately limited to claims dating
from 1975. In contrast, the Labour administration after coming into power in 1984,
demonstrated greater political willingness to address these issues. Hence, the
powers of the Tribunal were widened in 1985 to consider all claims dating from the
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.
Maori from the Muriwhenua or northernmost region of the North Island
lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal. The Muriwhenua claim to the Tribunal
was concerned with fisheries as well as land. The fisheries portion of the Muri-
whenua claim was principally concerned with the contention that full Crown
control of the fisheries was contrary to the Treaty. The Maori people argue they
have not surrendered the fisheries guaranteed to them under Article II of the
Treaty of Waitangi. In its report, the Tribunal noted that while the Northland
fishery had not suffered the same impacts from pollution as in other areas, the160 AU Memon and Cullen
impact of resource depletion through overfishing was just as severe here (Wai-
tangi Tribunal 1988).
The Tribunal documented a long chain of events that had contributed to this
outcome. The first example of resource depletion was that of the grey mullet
fishery. Booming in the 1870s and 1880s, it was reported to be in decline by as
early as 1895.^ The innovation of steam trawlers in the New Zealand fishing
industry in 1916, followed by technologically more sophisticated trawl/seine op-
erations, further contributed to resource depletion. In 1963 the government
adopted fresh policy initiatives to encourage the New Zealand inshore fishing
industry. In response to this, '. . . both small and large operators worked their
way up the coast, ranging from trawlers at sea to small trailer borne boats on land.
Muriwhenua was not exempted, despite its remote position. . . . Their coastlines
are now dominated by trawlers and fishermen based in the south.'* The more
recent growing crisis of the inshore fishery in Northland was precipitated by
events following the declaration of the Exclusive Economic Zone in 1977. Serious
overfishing in many inshore fisheries required rapid action and the moves taken in
1983 included mandatory removal from the industry of all fishermen earning less
than 80 percent of their income or $10,000 per year from fishing. An unanticipated
outcome of these actions on the inshore fishery was their disproportionate impact
on Maori fishing operations. At a regional level, a considerable proportion of the
Maori population in Northland and the East Coast made a living from fishing. But
unlike most European fishing operations, the Maori fishing operations generally
tended to be small scale, single person, often part-time ventures and restricted to
harvesting inshore waters.
The reasons for this exclusion of part-time and small scale fishers from the
industry are unclear as little was achieved in terms of effort reduction. A 1983
MAF document commented '. . . the exclusion of all "part-time" fishermen
would have a very minor impact on the industry although it would reduce the
potential for expansion of effort from that sector.'^ Exclusion of part-timers could
not be justified on efficiency grounds as the same MAF study commented that
profitability was inversely related to vessel size among the inshore trawl fieet.'"
MAF were warned that such policies could have devastating social impacts,
particularly in Northland, and the Ministry commissioned a social impact report
to identify possible modifications to the ITQ proposals which might minimise
some of the adverse consequences. Unfortunately, the recommendations of the
Fairgray Report (1986) were ignored by MAF. The Fairgray Report also showed
that in 1984/85, 300 Northland fishermen, mostly Maori, lost their licences, usu-
ally after failing to meet MAF requirements. Having cut out the smallest opera-
tors, quota was then allocated to those who fished a particular species. But since
the aim was to cut back on the overfishing, the Total Allowable Catch was re-
duced for many species. Where this occurred, quota was allocated on a pro rata
basis, which meant that the next layer of smaller fishers received so little quota
that it was no longer viable to remain in the industry. The initial quota was
allocated without change but when quota became tradable commodity, large com-
^ Waitangi Tribunal (1988), p. 94.
» Waitangi Tribunal (1988) p. 119.
' MAF (1983) p. 4.
•o MAF (1983) p. 4.New Zealand Maori 161
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Source: Department of Statistics, The New Zealand Labour Force.
panies moved in, buying up quota that was commercially non-viable. Small scale
fishers were hard hit by the introduction of the quota system because banks were
unwilling to accept quota as collateral and therefore would not lend against it. This
constraint on availability of capital meant small scale fishers who held non-viable
parcels of quota were unable to purchase further quota. Large companies could of
course borrow against other assets and moved to buy up quota from small scale
operators." The Maori unemployment rate which was already double that for the
total labour force, was undoubtedly exacerbated as a result of these fisheries
policies.
These changes had a disproportionate impact on the Muriwhenua claimants,
alongside several other Maori fishing communities, and contributed to the lodging
of the Muriwhenua claim with the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal's findings and
recommendations were issued to the government incrementally in four reports
and memoranda between December 1986 and June 1988 and may be summarised
as follows:
1. The allocation of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) could prejudice the
Muriwhenua claim, and considerable disruption and need for compensation
may ensue if ITQs were issued. (December 1986 memorandum to the Min-
ister of Agriculture and Fisheries).
2. The fisheries were owned by the Maori in the same way as land, the Crown
therefore was required under the Treaty to negotiate for a right of commer-
cial use. (September 1987 memorandum to the Minister of Maori Affairs).
3a. The Treaty guaranteed to Maori full protection for their fishing activities,
" Geen (1987) p. 13.762 Aii Memon and Cullen
including unrestricted rights to develop them along either or both custom-
ary or modern lines. Without prior agreement (which was not obtained),
general fishing could neither delimit nor restrict this Maori fishing interest:
to the extent that general fishing might do so, the Crown is bound to
intervene.
3b. The fishing activities of the Muriwhenua people involved the whole of the
adjacent continental shelf. Those activities, in fact, had been developed on
commercial lines, and would have been developed as a commercial indus-
try, had the Treaty guarantee been maintained by the Crown.
3c. The Crown is obliged to support Maori economic initiatives in fishing, or
otherwise to seek arrangements whereby Maori and non-Maori fishing
could proceed to the mutual advantage of both sides. It is consistent with
the Treaty and in the interests of both peoples that new agreements or
arrangements on fishing should now be sought. In Muriwhenua, the
Crown must bargain for any public right to the commercial exploitation of
the inshore fishery. In terms of the Treaty, the Crown's only interest in
that fishery at present is the full protection and promotion of tribal fishing
activities.
3d. The Quota Management System, as currently applied is in fundamental
confiict with the Treaty's principles and terms, apportioning to over-
whelmingly non-Maori the full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of
the property in fishing that was guaranteed to the Maori. However, the
Quota Management System need not be in confiict with the Treaty, and
may be beneficial to both parties, if an agreement or arrangement can be
reached.
3e. The damage to the Muriwhenua tribes had included the loss of a viable
industry. Very substantial relief to the claimants is required in respect of
past breaches and to restore their fishing economy to what it might have
been. A long term programme of rehabilitation is required and special
account must be taken of their reliance on fishing due to the small area
available to them, the lack of alternative industries in the district and the
need to rebuild their communities. (June 1988 Report).
The Tribunal advocated bicultural negotiations to resolve the matters of resource
allocation. The Crown chose to politely ignore the Tribunal's recommendation of
December 1986 not to allocate quotas until the Tribunal had the opportunity to
repbrt to the Ministers and that report had been considered. The Director-General
of Agriculture stated that the Crown had already made key policy decisions and
created expectations of prompt issuance of ITQs, and would proceed to issue
ITQs. Following the refusal by the Crown to accept the September 1987 recom-
mendation of the Tribunal not to take further steps to implement the ITQ policy,
the Muriwhenua along with seven other claimants and the New Zealand Maori
Council applied to the High Court for restraining orders. Temporary orders were
issued for the Muriwhenua territory only, and subsequently in November 1987 for
the whole fishery, until the Maori fishing rights question could be fully and finally
resolved.
This forced the Crown to negotiate with the Maori owners by convening a
Joint Working Group on Maori Fisheries to report to the Crown and Maori tribesNew Zealand Maori 163
on Maori fishing rights by June 1988. The group comprised four Maori members
from the claimant tribes and four Crown representatives.
The Maori members of this group focussed on three particular themes: tino
rangatiratanga (defined as tribal control of tribal resources), resource allocation,
and conservation of the fisheries resource. They claimed rights over all the fish-
eries of New Zealand but they were prepared to concede 50 percent of this
resource to the Crown. Taking into account the need for conservation as well as
economic development, they proposed that the two functions be exercised by
separate bodies. Management and conservation of the fisheries would be exer-
cised by a Commission. Development of the Maori share of the resource would be
vested in a Maori corporate authority. The main proposal from the Crown nego-
tiators bore an uncanny resemblance to Treasury's earlier plans for FishCorp—
the establishment of a new fisheries control institution with commercial objec-
tives. Within the commercial framework, it would also 'enhance the fishery re-
source' and 'protect the fisheries.' In deference to the Treaty of Waitangi, the
proposed agency would be bicultural and permit a minority Maori membership
(Public Eyes 1989).
Negotiations took place between the two parties but since they could not reach
an agreement, the matter went back to the government. In August 1988, the High
Court granted orders sought by the Crown allowing the fishing season to begin on
1 October unhindered by the discussions.
The Maori Fisheries Bills
The Maori Fisheries Bill introduced in September 1988 contained some matters
agreed upon between parties and acknowledged that the Maori do have a legal
right to the fishery resource. But it went much further in introducing matters
pertaining to fresh water fisheries not under negotiation. Even more significant, it
proposed a restrictive allocation of quota. Under the Bill, Maori tribes would
receive 2.5 percent of fishing quota each year, until they reached 50 percent,
provided that the tribes fished 'substantially' their yearly allocation. As a matter
of fact, the government did not expect the tribes to fully exploit the yearly allo-
cation and gain 50 percent control of the resource.
In exchange for these rights, the Bill sought to repeal Maori rights of access to
Courts and the Waitangi Tribunal with respect to fisheries, under the Treaty of
Waitangi or under any rule of law relating to aboriginal title. It proposed to repeal
Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 which states that. . . 'Nothing in this Act
shall affect any Maori fishing rights.' Hence, in the future, they would be barred
from legal action and would be dependent on the Crown's interpretation of their
fishing rights under the Treaty of Waitangi. Finally, it made provision for local non-
commercial fisheries zones with local management committees, but did not specify
criteria for selecting committee members nor guarantee traditional fishing access.
While recognising Maori fishery rights, there was no intention on the part of
the government to transfer the resource rental for this quota to Maori tribes in
order that they could redevelop their fishing industry. On the contrary, Maori
tribes were to be charged a rental for the fishery resources they claimed under the
Treaty. However provision was made for $10 million to be transferred to the tribes
for the development of the industry.164 Ali Memon and Cullen
In protest at the proposed Bill, the New Zealand Maori Council filed proceed-
ings in the High Court in September 1988 claiming negligence by the Crown for
having failed to protect Maori fisheries as guaranteed by the Treaty and as pro-
tected by Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act (which the Bill sought to repeal). A
Crown proposal reported in the media in October 1988 suggested that Maori rights
of access to Courts and the Tribunal could be retained if the total quota allocation
to Maori were reduced to 10 percent from 50 percent.
In the face of widespread condemnation of many features of the Bill, it was
drastically revised, reintroduced into the House and became legislation on 20
December 1989 (Maori Fisheries Act 1989). The Maori Fisheries Act established
a Maori Fisheries Commission and agreed to grant a total of 10 percent of the
fishing quota to the Commission on behalf of iwi. In addition the Government
provided $10 million finance to the Commission to help establish Maori fishing
operations. The Act required the Commission to create a commercial company
Aotearoa Fisheries Limited, and transfer half of the Maori fishing quota and the
funding to it. Finally the Act establishes Taiapure—Local Fisheries, to provide for
iwi or hapu use of estuarine and coastal waters as food sources and for spiritual
or cultural reasons.'^ Accompanying these actions are moves to extend the quota
management system to rock lobster fisheries and to grant up to ten percent of the
quota to Maori fishing operations. Freshwater fisheries however are excluded
frorh consideration under the Act.
Wider Implications
The Maori Fisheries Commission and its commercial arm, Aotearoa Fisheries
Limited, have been appointed as trustees of the quota by Parliament, until 1992
when the Act enables the quota to be allocated to individual iwi. The Commission
and the company share a common objective to enable the Maori to become a
major participant in the New Zealand fishing industry. As required in the Act,
transfer of quota in sections of 2.5 percent per year began in February 1990. The
Commission can lease on the open market the balance of the quota left, after the
allocation to Aotearoa Fisheries Limited. However the Commission has chosen to
allocate the remaining quota preferentially to iwi based sea fishing groups, or to
individuals. In comparison the company is obliged to act in a commercial manner
and has sought to achieve its legislative mandate by seeking the greatest financial
return for its quota on the international market. The Commission and the com-
pany have negotiated a number of joint ventures with established New Zealand
and foreign firms. The Commission has also endeavoured to purchase quota in its
own right on the open market, additional to the basic ten percent allocated to it,
in an attempt to extend its control over the fishery resource.
Interpretation of the Act is totally dependent on perspective. The success of
the Government in resolving a very difficult crisis has been generally welcomed
by the Maori as well as the fishing industry. The fishing industry has generally
welcomed the new law as it awards the 2.5 percent annual increase in quota from
new resources rather than reducing the share held by existing fishing companies.
From a Maori viewpoint, it appears battles won in the past have resulted in
'^ Iwi are subgroups within a tribe. Hapu are family or kin groups.New Zealand Maori 165
ownership of a limited share of fishery resources. The proportion granted, a
maximum of ten percent of quota, is clearly far less than the complete ownership
recognised in the Treaty, or the fifty percent proposed by Maori as a starting point
in negotiations. From a Crown perspective, the assertion of total Crown owner-
ship implicit in the quota management system, has had to be conceded, but early
Maori successes before the Waitangi Tribunal and in the High Court, have been
contained, damage control has kept the share of resources granted to ten percent,
approximately the proportion of Maori in the total population.'^
It is significant that a Maori leader who played a prominent role in negotiations
with the Crown and currently heads the Commission, sees the Act only as an
interim agreement between the Crown and iwi, whilst preparing for future action
to own and control the balance of the fifty percent share of the country's fishery
resources.'"* Negotiations with the Crown are continuing, to determine the full
extent of Maori fishing rights, including the rights to non-quota species, the
coastal rights and freshwater fisheries. The outcome of these negotiations remains
to be seen.
More immediately, there are difficult problems to be resolved relating to the
ownership of the Maori fishing quota and the future role of the fishing company as
a commercial arm of the Commission. The Act provoked some anger amongst
certain Maori as it appears to award a share in fishery resources to landlocked
tribes. Some tribes are adamant that the Maori fishing asset is iwi property,
guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi and in keeping with the intentions of the
Maori Fisheries Act, and not for collective Maori ownership. The existence of the
fishing company has been deeply resented as paternalistic and a forced imposition
on tribal autonomy. During the process of negotiations and Select Committee
hearings leading to the Maori Fisheries Act, Maoridom strongly advocated a tribal
distribution of quota. But the tribal aspirations did not prove politically acceptable
to the policy makers, in the face of concern about economic efficiency and tribal
squabbles over the resources. One result of this non-tribal distribution of re-
sources is that the Aotearoa Fisheries company is perceived as bringing no benefit
to the Maori fisherman of the far north of New Zealand, on whose behalf the
Muriwhenua claim was lodged.'^ Seafishing iwi in particular see the company as
taking away half of the quota they could be using.
But an equally compelling alternative view, based on economic rationality and
pragmatic considerations, is that after 1992, the deep water species from the
Maori quota should be allocated by the Commission to a pan-tribal company
owned on behalf of, and to the benefit of all Maori. The Commission has to
balance the desire on the part of some iwi who want control of their own quota,
against the reality of the relatively small size of the quota available and the small
parcels that would exist were this quota fractionalised among many iwi.
Moreover defining iwi property rights is a difficult task. Some of the alterna-
tives considered include: should the quota be allocated amongst the numerous
" Native people in other countries have similarly, recently had resources and cash granted
to them. Witness the recent Canadian government decision to return 180,000 sq km to
15,000 Dene and Meti Indians. C$500m is also to be provided in cash grants over the next
20 years. Otago Daily Times (1990).
'" Statement by the Maori Fisheries Commission Chairman Tipene O'Regan, quoted in the
newsletter of the Maori Fisheries Commission, 1990.
'^ New Zealand Herald, 1991.166 AU Memon and Cullen
tribes or to groups of iwi on a regional basis? Should the Commission allocate a
share of the total quota, or should it portion out each species in each area to iwi
who have coast line bordering a particular fishing zone? Already concerns have
been expressed by South Island Maori leaders about North Island tribes fishing in
their region.
Conclusion
Literal interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi acknowledges Maori owned all
fishery resources and only through voluntary sale could those resources be lost.
This was the interpretation of the Waitangi Tribunal which, however, has proved
politically unacceptable to the general population and to Parliament. Equally the
notion of te tino rangitiratanga has only very grudgingly been accepted by the
Crown. Limited management rights over fishery resources have been granted in
Taiapure-Local fisheries. Clearly, much less than equal partnership status has
been attained. If the Maori Fisheries Act is a highwater mark of Maori ownership
and control of fishery resources, a pessimist can argue little has been gained. An
optimist however, may argue that any gains over an apparent starting point of zero
represents considerable success.
Recent rapid growth in fish catches and fish exports has revealed the magni-
tude and value of the New Zealand fishery resource. During the one hundred and
fifty year period since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori rights to those
resQurces have been dramatically circumscribed. Accretion of rights to the Crown
and private interests has occurred at great cost to Maori, both historically, and
more particularly since the gazettal of the Exclusive Economic Zone in 1977, and
the introduction in 1986 of the Quota Management System. Recourse to the
Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, the Courts, and finally negotiation with the Crown
has forced the return of some of those fishing rights, and has wrung from the
Crown an admission that Maori do have rights guaranteed under the Treaty of
Waitangi. The lessons learned here may provide useful guidance in other con-
tested resource ownership and management issues.
The Maori population has the highest rate of unemployment in New Zealand.
While the longer term significance of the gains that have been made in securing
control over resources such as fisheries should not be underestimated, the ex-
pectation of immediate and direct employment and income benefits from the
Maori fishing quota may prove to be misplaced. The Maori Fisheries Act has
enaljled the Maori to join an industry which is undergoing substantial restructur-
ing. Many parts of the industry are still overcapitalised and it is a high risk
investment area. Some species have recently been fished at unsustainable levels
and the effectiveness of the Individual Transferable Quota system is compromised
by a lack of information. The fishing industry currently employs about 100,000
people, nearly thirty percent of them are Maori. But the capacity of the industry
to employ more people is limited.
Economic considerations underline the need for a strategic longer term view of
iwi fishing rights. Rather than splitting the quota amongst numerous iwi, collective
management by a company, or two or three companies on behalf of iwi, may be
the most realistic way to manage the assets. The prospect of the quota becoming
so fragmented as to be unprofitable cannot be lightly dismissed.New Zealand Maori 167
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